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ABSTRACT 
Daydreaming, or the seemingly aimless and inadvertent roaming of the mind, is a common 
experience that each of us undergoes several times a day during our waking lives. This 
fascinating phenomenon, which has been described as being akin to a “private theater” is 
typically considered an altered state in relation to human consciousness as well as a central 
operation within the playground of the human imagination. This paper provides a selective 
overview of the types and functions of daydreaming as well as reflections on daydreaming 
as an altered state of consciousness and daydreaming as a facet of the imagination. In doing 
so, attention is drawn towards critical factors to consider when interpreting findings from 
the purview of each of these perspectives of study which points to the necessity to question 
implicit assumptions that are in place about this core human propensity.  
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We know the feeling all too well. One sets forth to undertake an activity with a clear 
objective in mind, like writing a paper on the topic of daydreaming for a special issue on 
altered states of consciousness. After a period of diligent goal-directed thought and action, 
one finds oneself completely off course in an altogether different conceptual space, 
mentally exploring realms that have little to do with the original plan or narrative. In one of 
his earliest works on the topic, Jerome Singer stated that “daydreaming represents a shift of 
attention away from some primary physical or mental task we have set for ourselves, or 
away from directly looking at listening to something in the external environment, toward an 
unfolding sequence of private responses made to some internal stimulus” (Singer, 1975: 3, 
original italics). Singer went on to aver that daydreaming is “one manifestation” of what 
William James magnificently termed the “stream of consciousness” – a deeply resonant 
phrase that is illustrative of two key features of personal consciousness, namely that the 
states or contents of one’s consciousness are ever-changing, but that the experience itself 
of one’s consciousness is nonetheless “sensibly continuous” (James, 1891). This paper 
critically explores the phenomenon of daydreaming with reference to its types and 
functions, its status as an altered state of consciousness, and its manifestation as a facet of 
the imagination. It ends with reflections on its mechanisms, and critical issues to consider in 
relation to daydreaming that has implications for how we construe its very nature.  
  
Definitions, Types and Functions of Daydreaming 
In order to follow an empirical approach in the study of daydreaming, a systematic 
operationalization of the construct was necessary (Farthing, 1992). Early frameworks saw 
the characterization of daydreaming as “stimulus-independent mentation” (SIM) given that 
performing any given task (e.g., watching TV, washing dishes, riding a bicycle) involved 
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directing attention to the external world. During daydreaming, however, the content of 
one’s thoughts are unrelated to the task one is performing and is hence not derived from 
stimuli in the external world (Singer, 1975). So the first conceptualizations emphasized the 
independence of the informational contents of daydreaming from the informational 
contents of the external environment arriving at the senses.  
 
However, the need to question this assumption of stimulus independence as well as 
acknowledge the sheer heterogeneity of experience that was possible during daydreaming 
was soon recognized. Daydreaming can take myriad forms after all, from personal fantasies 
to practical daily life considerations and the latter could be quite clearly tied to the present 
task setting (Klinger, 1978). So another influential definition saw "daydreaming as 
unintended mental content, nonworking, noninstrumental content that comes to mind 
unbidden and effortlessly - that is spontaneously" (Klinger, 2009: 225). In doing so, the 
avolitional nature of this state was emphasized. A key distinction was thereby proposed 
between ‘respondent’ (elicited/involuntary) thoughts and ‘operant’ (emitted/voluntary) 
thoughts, both of which could occur in ‘stimulus-bound’ (related to the current task setting) 
or ‘stimulus-independent’ (unrelated to the current task setting) contexts (Farthing, 1992).  
 
In addition to defining daydreaming and outlining its essential properties, another key factor 
to consider was that when our minds are free to roam, we experience a variety of dissimilar 
mental states. Early work on the domains of daydreaming, stimulus-independent and task-
unrelated thought (Antrobus, 1968; Giambra, 1995; Singer, 1975; Singer & Antrobus, 1963) 
paved the way for distinguishing between positive-constructive daydreaming (“playful, 
wishful imagery, and planful, creative thought”), guilty-dysphoric daydreaming (“obsessive, 
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anguished fantasies”) and poor attentional control (“the inability to concentrate on either 
the ongoing thought or the external task”) (McMillan, Kaufman, & Singer, 2013: 1). This has 
some parallels with contemporary work where positive habitual thoughts and spontaneous 
off task thoughts during mind wandering were contrasted in terms of their differing wider 
impact on other psychological variables as well as brain activity patterns (Wang et al., 2017).  
 
The focus on different dimensions of mind wandering is largely motivated by the necessity 
to explain the disparate findings associated with this fundamental human faculty 
(Mooneyham et al., 2016; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). On one hand, there are 
studies showing circumscribed advantages in information processing in relation to mind 
wandering, such as in the domains of creativity, memory consolidation, future thinking and 
dishabituation. On the other hand, there is also evidence to show that mind wandering is 
associated with unhappiness and can exert a disruptive influence when engaged in goal-
directed behaviors, such as during reading and driving, both of which necessitate the 
maintenance of external vigilance and optimal working memory.  
 
Two hypotheses have been proposed to accommodate such divergent results (Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2014). The ‘context regulation hypothesis’ holds that self-generated thought (SGT) 
commonly occurs in cognitively undemanding contexts. So when SGTs transpire in contexts 
that necessitate continuous attention it can be disadvantageous, whereas when SGTs take 
place in non-demanding contexts they can be beneficial. Alternatively, the ‘content 
regulation hypothesis’ holds that SGTs that are future-oriented are positive, adaptive and 
promote wellbeing whereas SGTs that are past-oriented are likely to be negative, 
maladaptive and indicative of unhappiness. So while positive-constructive daydreaming is 
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largely associated with positive outcomes, the opposite is deemed to be true of the other 
dimensions, namely guilty-dysphoric daydreaming and poor attentional control.  
 
The impact of cognitive demands is also investigated from the vantage point of the 
association between mind wandering and executive functions like working memory. 
Cognitive demands are embedded within the task context but the degree to which one is 
impacted by task-based cognitive demands is influenced by an individual’s capacity to deal 
with such contextual demands. Impoverished executive capacity is associated with a greater 
propensity for mind wandering in keeping with the ‘control-failure hypothesis’ (McVay & 
Kane, 2009, 2010). At the same time though, performing tasks associated with higher 
executive demands are associated with diminished mind wandering in line with the ‘global 
availability hypothesis’ which holds that more executive resources should be associated 
with greater frequency in mind wandering (Smallwood, 2010). It appears that here too the 
type of daydreaming one is engaged in (positive or negative) plays a significant role as it 
mediates the association between mind wandering and executive functions (Marcusson-
Clavertz, Cardeña, & Terhune, 2016).  
 
There are still further distinctions across disciplines about how best to construe dimensions, 
features and types of daydreaming.  Mind wandering is typically regarded as a state that 
“often occurs without intention … or even awareness that one’s mind has drifted” 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006: 946) but at the same time is characterized by meta-
awareness or “the ability to take explicit note of the current contents of consciousness” as 
well as perceptual decoupling or “the capacity to disengage from perception” (Schooler et 
al., 2011: 319) (for an alternative definition that does not presuppose meta-awareness in 
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mind wandering, see Metzinger, 2013). In psychology and neuroscience, the terms ‘mind 
wandering’ and ‘daydreaming’ are often used interchangeably. Conceptualizations 
regarding their distinctions largely stem from empirical contexts in which they are examined 
as “daydreaming entails engaging in spontaneous thoughts unrelated to one’s current 
context (i.e., stimulus-independent), and mind wandering has been defined as daydreaming 
occuring while performing another task” (Zedelius & Schooler, 2015: 1).  
 
In the philosophical tradition, however, mind wandering is sometimes viewed as a type of 
daydreaming that is distinct from other types of daydreaming (Dorsch, 2015). Mind 
wandering in this context is seen as akin to spontaneously occurring task-unrelated 
thoughts which is distinct from ‘focused daydreaming’ where “we also withdraw from the 
world surrounding us and start to experience or think about objects and events that are 
largely absent, past or imaginary. But we take a much more active part in directing the order 
and content of our mental episodes and usually stick to a particular topic or issue” (Dorsch, 
2015: 792). This is akin to other conceptualizations from the early psychological theorizing 
on this topic that distinguished between ‘spontaneous mind wandering’ and ‘deliberate 
mind wandering’ (Giambra, 1995) as well as more recent drives to distinguish intentional 
and unintentional mind wandering (Seli, Risko, Smilek, & Schacter, 2016).  
 
Still others postulate that mind wandering is a state of “unguided attention” which is what 
makes it distinct from other internally oriented states like rumination and absorption which 
are considered instead to reflect instances of internally oriented guided attention (Irving, 
2016). The purposive oxymoron – unguided attention – in relation to mind wandering is 
employed to illustrate the fact that although the state of mind wandering appears 
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undirected and purposeless, in actuality our minds tend to predominantly vacillate towards 
consideration of our personal goals. Such a “prospective bias” in mind wandering is 
confirmed in empirical work (Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2015; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, 
Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011), and it necessitates the important question of how 
best to conceive of ‘goal-directedness’ in internal mentation because the propensity to only 
consider ‘goals’ as limited to the context of an external task translates to a failure to fully 
take into account the wider dynamics of our inner experience.  
 
An overview of two perspectives on daydreaming that stem from largely separate academic 
domains, consciousness and imagination, are presented in the following two sections. A 
selection of key themes will be explored alongside critical questions to consider within these 
fields.  
 
Daydreaming as an Altered State of Consciousness  
The inevitability of mentally drifting away from a task one is performing is a 
phenomenological state that each of us routinely experiences. In fact, empirical 
investigations estimate that this inexorable propensity to daydream, mind wander, or fall 
into states of reverie and fantasy occupies “at least 25-50% of our waking lives” (Konishi & 
Smallwood, 2016). In reality this number is likely to be higher as such estimates are largely 
derived from experience or thought sampling paradigms where study participants are 
prompted at intervals over an extended period of time to report their current state with 
regard to whether their minds have wandered from the activity at hand or not (Kane et al., 
2007; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Klinger & Cox, 1987). Such protocols allow one to 
record the number of times a person has confessed to daydreaming when prompted but 
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not how much time has elapsed in that state, which would in any event be difficult to 
accurately report given that the experience in itself is characterized by a loss or ambiguity of 
the sense of time. Moreover, the prompt to report one’s current phenomenological state in 
and of itself rouses the daydreaming person out of the state of reverie and thereby curtails 
the experience of mind wandering. Indeed, little consideration has been given in such 
contexts to the case that asking a participant to reflect on the content of their mentation 
changes the phenomenon under study. Additional variability is also introduced by the fact 
that are differences in the types of contexts in which daydreaming is more frequent with 
“praying/worshipping/meditating,” “listening to the radio, news,” and “making love” 
associated with lowest occurrences of mind wandering (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). 
These are all factors to bear in mind when contemplating the frequency of mind wandering 
within and across the daily lives of individuals.  
 
The relatively high experiential frequency of daydreaming or mind wandering indicates its 
normative nature and therefore also begs the question as to why the phenomenon is 
classified as an ‘altered state’ of consciousness (Vaitl et al., 2005) when it is one that we 
routinely and inevitably consciously experience over a substantial period of our day-to-day 
living. This potentially stems from an unchecked assumption that there is but one ‘standard 
state’ of consciousness, and that the key characteristic of this state is of being aware and 
alert to one’s external environment. It should be noted though that daydreaming was not 
always regarded as an altered state of consciousness. In one of the landmark papers within 
this field, Arnold Ludwig (1966) provided the following definition of altered states. “For the 
purpose of discussion, I shall regard "altered state(s) of consciousness" [hereafter referred 
to as ASC(s)] as any mental state(s), induced by various physiological, psychological, or 
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pharmacological maneuvers or agents, which can be recognized subjectively by the 
individual himself (or by an objective observer of the individual) as representing a sufficient 
deviation in subjective experience or psychological functioning from certain general norms 
for that individual during alert, waking consciousness. This sufficient deviation may be 
represented by a greater preoccupation than usual with internal sensations or mental 
processes, changes in the formal characteristics of thought, and impairment of reality 
testing to various degrees” (Ludwig, 1966: 225, my italics). Note that central to this idea of 
an altered stated is that there is something non-normative about the phenomenology at the 
level of the individual.  
 
Indeed, William Farthing in his seminal book on consciousness explicitly stated the 
following: “Daydreaming is different from active externally oriented consciousness, but 
because it is within the normal range of conscious experience it is usually not considered to 
be an ASC” (Farthing, 1992: 203). This is because, in addition to wide individual differences 
in the patterns of normal waking states, "the concept of a "normal" waking state of 
consciousness is, in a sense, a convenient fiction. Your waking state can vary widely during 
the course of a day, from an alert, active externally oriented state to a relaxed or drowsy, 
inner-oriented, daydreamy state" (Farthing, 1992: 206). Having said that, there are parallels 
between state of daydreaming and that of ASCs like meditation, sleep, drug-induced states, 
transcendental and sensory deprivation experiences, and this potentially explains why 
daydreaming is often allocated to the ASC bandwagon.  
 
ASCs are identified by virtue of changes in subjective experience and psychological 
functioning (Tart, 1975) and are associated with 14 dimensions of changed subjective 
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experience. These include changes in attention, perception, inner speech, memory, higher-
level thought processes, imagery and fantasy, the meaning of experiences, the experience 
of time, arousal, emotional feeling and expression, self-control, suggestibility, body image, 
and sense of personal identity (Farthing, 1992).  Some of these overlap with commonly 
occurring features of daydreaming which include inner speech, inner seeing, unsymbolized 
thinking, feelings or affective experiences, and sensory awareness of particular facets of the 
environment (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). Indeed, the phenomenological dimensions 
associated with daydreaming are relaxed activation (or reduced readiness to act), narrow 
awareness span (or focused attention on singular content), increased sensory dynamics (or 
lower thresholds and hyperesthesia) and self-awareness (reflective absorption), all of which 
are similar to that of other spontaneously occurring ASCs such as near-death experience and 
hypnagogic states (Vaitl et al., 2005).  
 
Phenomenologically speaking then, daydreaming appears to be a somewhat special case 
because it can both be and not be an ASC depending on the focus of analysis one adopts. So 
one of the open questions in this context is what is the best way to conceive of 
daydreaming? Perhaps it occupies the central zone of the potential continuum between 
non-altered and altered states of consciousness. Or perhaps a classification of the different 
types of standard or non-altered states of consciousness (of which daydreaming is one type) 
needs to be outlined as a parallel to that of altered states of consciousness. Indeed, the next 
section will highlight how another lens on daydreaming sees it allocated within a 
constellation of imaginative mental operations that is typically pitted against purportedly 
“non-imaginative” counterparts.  
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Daydreaming as an Facet of Imagination 
In 1997, a group of neuroscientists took on an unconventional approach when examining 
the pattern of brain activity elicited across several functional brain imaging datasets by 
looking beyond customary brain activity ‘increases’ as a function of task performance by 
extending the focus to brain activity ‘decreases’ in relation to the same. What they found 
was that a set of brain regions was consistently less engaged during active goal-directed 
language and non-language tasks (Shulman et al., 1997). Early on this brain network was 
therefore referred to ask a ‘task-negative’ network (for a discussion on misconceptions that 
stem from this phrase, see Spreng, 2012), which was more active when engaged in passive 
contexts or tasks of low cognitive demand relative to tasks of high cognitive demand. 
Indeed, as this network was highly active during periods of rest in the absence of externally 
imposed task demands, it was dubbed the ‘default mode network’ (DMN) of the brain in 
that it reflected the baseline pattern of functional brain activity (Gusnard, Raichle, & 
Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al., 2001; Raichle, 2015).  
 
Right at the outset, the relevance of the DMN for self-referential and reflective mental 
operations was noted (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001) and fit with earlier 
postulations concerning the types of operations (episodic, dreamlike, and so on) that were 
likely to be involved under conditions of rest and would influence brain activity patterns 
(Andreasen et al., 1995). The particular relevance of the DMN for daydreaming and 
‘stimulus-independent thought’ was highlighted as the propensity for mind wandering was 
positively correlated with activity in regions within this brain network (Mason et al., 2007). 
Using retrospective thought sampling procedures where participants were asked to report 
what occupied their minds during periods of rest when they were not assigned any 
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particular task, participants reported being in a blank state of mind only 5% of the time. 
Instead, their minds were actively engaged in internal mentation where they spontaneously 
reflected on a range of themes including their own personal or episodic past (19%) and 
future (30%) (Andrews-Hanna, 2012).  
 
What is particularly notable is the overlap between the contexts that engage the DMN, 
either spontaneously (via task-unrelated or stimulus-independent mind wandering) or 
deliberately (via task-elicited or stimulus-dependent goal directed thought). This brain 
network is activated during both spontaneous cognition and deliberate cognition in contexts 
that call for internal mentation in terms of self-referential processing (am I ambitious?), 
mental state reasoning or theory of mind (does she believe that I am ambitious?), moral 
reasoning (is this behavior conscionable?), autobiographical and episodic memory retrieval 
(when was the last time I built a snowman?), and episodic future thinking or prospection 
(when will I build a snowman again?) (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Spreng & 
Grady, 2009; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009). Given the role of the DMN in contexts of self and 
social relevance, the network has been characterized as one that “primes the intentional 
stance” which refers to the “irresistible tendency to conceive the actions of others as 
intentional and guided by beliefs and desires” (Spunt, Meyer, & Lieberman, 2015: 1116). 
However, the reality is more complex than that as the DMN is spontaneously engaged at the 
mere suggestion of self-relevance or personal significance associated with the presented 
stimuli even in tasks that do not necessitate these types of internal mentation for optimal 
task performance (Abraham & von Cramon, 2009; Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010; Sui, 
Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2013).  
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It is also necessary to bear in mind that not only is the DMN is engaged in contexts that are 
beyond and unlike that of mind wandering (e.g., Vatansever, Menon, Manktelow, Sahakian, 
& Stamatakis, 2015), the enormous surge in neuroimaging investigations of mind wandering 
in relation to the DMN have in fact revealed the need to consider the functional roles of 
regions outside the DMN in relation to mind wandering (Fox, Spreng, Ellamil, Andrews-
Hanna, & Christoff, 2015; Kucyi, 2017). Evidence for the involvement of the central 
executive network (CEN) in mind wandering in the past have been drawn upon to make the 
special case for mind wandering as eliciting joint activity in two distinct brain networks 
(Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009). As these two regions are ordinarily 
anti-correlated, a third brain network – the salience network (SN) – determines when to 
switch to the appropriate brain system: the DMN in contexts of internal mentation versus 
CEN in contexts that warrant externally-directed attention and cognitive control (Goulden et 
al., 2014; Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon, 2008). But a similar special case of jointly activated 
DMN and CEN networks are also made in relation to the brain basis of divergent thinking 
(Beaty, Benedek, Kaufman, & Silvia, 2015; Jung, Mead, Carrasco, & Flores, 2013), so this 
type of neural activity pattern cannot be held as singular to daydreaming. Moreover, there 
are alternate views concerning the dynamics between these three networks including that 
both the CEN and SN jointly regulate the DMN (Chen et al., 2013). Indeed, explorations of 
“transmodal” brain areas, termed thus due to their involvement in a wide array of diverse 
cognitive states and “whose activity is not specific to a single modality of sensory input or 
motor output” (Huntenburg, Bazin, & Margulies, 2018: 23) reveal that core structures of the 
DMN qualify as transmodal regions (Braga, Sharp, Leeson, Wise, & Leech, 2013; Mittner, 
Hawkins, Boekel, & Forstmann, 2016), potentially explaining the heterogeneous functional 
profile associated with this brain network.  
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So while the DMN is the key brain network involved in internally-directed cognition 
(Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014) of which mind wandering is one key aspect of 
spontaneous cognition (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna, 2016), the 
dynamics of the activity of this brain network cannot viewed in isolation from other key 
brain networks with which it closely interacts (Zabelina & Andrews-Hanna, 2016). It 
therefore important to not overstate or misrepresent the nature of the link between the 
DMN and daydreaming as being a simplistic or linear especially as “the cognitive processes 
that spontaneous DMN activity specifically reflects are only partially related to mind-
wandering and include also attentional state fluctuations that are not captured by self-
report” (Kucyi, Esterman, Riley, & Valera, 2016: 13899).  
 
Owing to the fact of DMN engagement across heterogeneous contexts, one theoretical 
framework viewed the DMN as facilitating ‘intentionality-based forms of imagination’ where 
the processing is “predominantly recollective in nature with a view to establishing the best 
possible explanation of a situation or event in question. This is brought about by means of 
spontaneous access to an extensive and diverse repertoire of relevant knowledge when 
processing such contexts. The best or most plausible explanation is the one that fits best 
with what is already known in terms of oneself and/or one’s world-view” (Abraham, 2016: 
4203). Parallels to this postulation are also found in other perspectives of the DMN in which 
it’s role was hypothesized to be in “the process of conceptualization—in which 
representations of prior experiences are brought to bear to construct representations of the 
past, the future, or the present moment. These regions are necessary to give meaning to 
others' actions, to make meaning of one's own core affective state, to recall prior 
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experiences during instances of memory and spontaneous thought, and to represent the 
meaning of concepts by simulating category instances” (Oosterwijk et al., 2012: 2124). 
Another view holds that the DMN plays an “auto-pilot” role such as during “automated 
decision-making under predictable environmental demands” where “automated, fast, and 
accurate responses” are called for in order to meet “worldly demands” (Vatansever, Menon, 
& Stamatakis, 2017). Daydreaming indeed routinely transpires in contexts in which we 
operate in autopilot mode, such as when driving under predictable conditions where 
incidences of mind wandering of around 70% have been reported (Baldwin et al., 2017).  
 
In the presence of such findings, a question that has arisen in this context is whether the 
DMN involvement in daydreaming reflects a functional specificity of this network for this 
function or if it is instead the case that daydreaming is related to DMN merely as an 
epiphenomenon of this brain network being involved in autopilot mode. One contemporary 
neuroscientific account seeks to accommodate both possibilities by proposing a single 
model that differentiates “between an exploratory 'off-focus' state and active mind 
wandering” (Mittner et al., 2016).  
 
The next and final section of the paper explores the wider issues to also consider given the 
aforementioned conceptualizations in relation to daydreaming at the level of definition as 
well as in relation to the imagination and altered states of consciousness.  
 
Further critical issues in the empirical study of daydreaming 
A range of critiques has been leveled at the empirical study of consciousness. Some 
highlight the essentially non-conscious underpinnings of the ‘contents of consciousness’ 
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which is neither influenced nor directed by the ‘experience of consciousness’ rendering 
consciousness to be ephiphenomenal (Oakley & Halligan, 2017). Others point to suspect 
rationale that typically underlie isomorphisms that are applied when mapping contents of 
conscious experience to neural substrates (Klein, 2015; Noë & Thompson, 2004). In addition 
to these important and relevant philosophical issues to consider are more commonplace 
assumptions surrounding paradigms and theoretical conceptualizations that also need to be 
questioned. Does the study of daydreaming obscure or alter vital aspects of the 
phenomenon itself? Do existing experimental paradigms constrain our understanding of the 
phenomenon? Are limitations at the level of the paradigm then generalized to conceive of 
limitations about the phenomenon? These are questions that are worth considering in more 
depth.   
 
 Take the following statement from a recent paper: “As the representations upon which we 
are focused during mind-wandering are different from those related to the stimuli in the 
moment, these experiences are by definition stimulus independent. Moreover, the gold 
standard method to assess the mind-wandering state is experience sampling (ES), which in 
turn depends on our capacity to introspect on our own experiences. Our capacity for meta-
cognition is therefore a key element to the mind-wandering state because it is how 
participants share their experiences with the experimenter” (Konishi & Smallwood, 2016: 
234). This points to how paradigm based factors (the means by which the participant 
conveys information to the experimenter) in the study of mind wandering influence 
conceptualizations of the phenomenon itself.  
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As the study of daydreaming is largely derived from conscious verbal self-reports, aspects of 
the phenomenon, such as awareness, that do not lend themselves to verbalization are not 
captured. “Awareness is really beyond definition in words, as words are only a small subset 
of the total functioning of mind. It loosely refers to our ultimate ability to know that 
something exists or is happening. In ordinary consciousness, awareness is usually almost 
totally wrapped up in words, internal talking to ourselves (which is what we usually mean by 
thought), but it is far more basic than words” (Tart, 1986: 161). This is notwithstanding the 
typical problems associated with verbal reports after the fact, such as forgetting, 
elaboration, and the impact of the duration of the delay period between the actual 
experience and the memory of that experience on the ability to report of the contents of 
the experience. It is therefore important to bear in mind that that only a slice of the actual 
experience of mind wandering is being empirically captured from which several broad 
generalizations are derived about the phenomenon. 
 
Another interesting dimension to take note of in that aforementioned Konishi & Smallwood 
(2016) quote is the significance ascribed to the term “stimulus” in relation to mind 
wandering. This is how it is commonly construed in the literature, namely that mind 
wandering is essentially  ‘stimulus-independent’ or ‘task-unrelated’ and such 
conceptualizations directly stem from the empirical context of behavioral testing. However, 
the generalization that daydreaming is entirely ‘stimulus-independent’ or ‘task-unrelated’ in 
day-to-day life is suspect from an ecological perspective because – outside of well-
controlled lab testing situations – we usually find ourselves in contexts that are deeply 
relevant to ourselves and way of being. Indeed, as mentioned earlier in the paper, even the 
earliest scholars of daydreaming drew attention to this reality (Klinger, 1978). 
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Think about the last time your mind wandered. Often the triggers for such mental journeys 
are stimuli within the environment. One is drinking coffee from one’s favorite cup and one is 
reminded of the occasion surrounding the cup and then one’s thoughts move to the people 
in that situation and what that person was wearing or saying. And so on. So while the 
wanderings journey beyond the immediate surroundings or context into the real past, the 
counterfactual past, future possibilities and fantasies, the starting point can be something in 
the environment. A strict limitation of stimulus independence is not necessary, and need 
not be stringently applied. Moreover, just because some aspects of the stimuli (liking a cup) 
are peripheral to the task or task-unrelated (drinking the coffee) in that it is not relevant to 
the goal of the task (quenching one’s thirst), one cannot conclude that the contextual 
information is irrelevant to the agent. Indeed, a clearer specification of what is meant by 
‘task-relatedness’ is essential if conceptions of mind wandering are tethered to it (Irving, 
2016). 
 
An insistence on stimulus independence also makes it challenging to explain some of the 
effects that are attributed to mind wandering, such as enhanced creative performance 
(Zedelius & Schooler, 2015). For instance, creative ideation in problem solving is 
accentuated when engaged in an undemanding task that promotes mind wandering 
compared to performing a highly demanding task or merely resting during the incubation 
period (Baird et al., 2012). It should be noted though that recent evidence suggests that this 
picture is far more complicated than is typically portrayed in the literature. Probes of task-
unrelated thoughts in the moment, a standard means by which mind wandering is assessed, 
were not found to predict divergent creative thinking whereas a questionnaire measure of 
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daydreaming propensity only weakly predicted the same (Smeekens & Kane, 2016). In any 
event, if mind wandering is held to be entirely divorced from the present context, how can it 
be useful in real time to abet creative problem solving? Explanations of how spontaneous 
internal mentation interacts with goal-directed task-specific cognition are therefore 
necessary in order to understand its wider impact.  
 
Concluding note 
The empirical study of daydreaming and mind wandering has grown in leaps and bounds 
since the 1960s, and this topic constitutes a very productive area of scientific inquiry in 
psychology and neuroscience in terms of the sheer volume of focus it garners in the 
literature. Its relevance as a theme of study is also expansive as it spans the complex 
domains of consciousness and imagination. This paper provided a selective overview of this 
topic with a view to highlighting the need to critically consider some of the assumptions that 
are central to this field which stand to significantly skew our understanding of the 
phenomenon itself. The importance of questioning assumptions is certainly applicable to all 
subjects of study, but nudging oneself to do so for topics that do not lend themselves as 
easily to such analysis is especially crucial. James Morley (1998) provides an eloquent 
argument that highlights why daydreaming is an interesting case in point. “The daydreaming 
subject collapses certain dualisms historically central to psychology, such as subject-object, 
mind-body, cognition-emotion, and real-imaginary. In light of this collapse, we can 
understand the daydreaming subject metaphorically, as both actor and spectator; or as 
writer, director, and critic; or as camera, film, projector, and screen. The artistic metaphors 
typically used by subjects express an intertwining of active and passive forms of 
consciousness in a complicated circuit of relationships” (Morley, 1998: 132-133).  
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We stand to gain greatly by refocusing our understanding of daydreaming and mind 
wandering as the veritable possibility space where consciousness meets imagination. This 
necessarily means coming to grips with the functional relationship not only between mind 
wandering and focused attention, but also between mind wandering and another state that 
is taken to occupy the other end of the phenomenological continuum (and is associated 
with ASCs related to meditation), namely mindfulness (Mooneyham et al., 2017; Mrazek, 
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012; but see Seli et al., 2016; Vago & Zeidan, 2016) or the “(1) 
awareness, (2) of present experience, (3) with acceptance” (Germer, 2005: 7). The relatively 
unexplored fascinating cross-connections between these domains of mentation offer fertile 
grounds for discovery that will enable us to inch closer to a clearer understanding the 
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